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“The brick walls are there for a reason. The brick walls are not there to keep us out.
The brick walls are there to give us a chance to show how badly we want something.
Because the brick walls are there to stop the people who don’t want it badly enough.
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1.1 Context and Motivation
Social media has revolutionised the way that users interact and communicate
online by introducing new and innovative ways for self-expression, relation-
ship formation, job seeking, and so on. Thanks to these advantages, social me-
dia platforms (SMP) attract massive numbers of users. For example, since its
creation in 2004, Facebook has attracted 1.49 billion monthly active users. 968
million of who access Facebook daily [24]. Likewise, Twitter has drawn about
316 million users since 2006 [63].
These users disclose large volumes of information during social media inter-
actions. For instance, every day about 350 million photos are shared on Face-
book [27], and 500 million tweets sent on Twitter [63]. Most of this information
is personal and sensitive in nature, as pointed out by Gross and Aquisti; and
Stuttmann, et al. [32, 60].
The ease with which such personal information can be accessed, and potentially
by a large number of people, exposes social media users to many privacy and
security risks. Examples of such privacy and security risks include identity
1
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theft, financial fraud, cyberstalking, cyberbullying, insurance and employment
discrimination, embarrassment and losing face with friends [27, 28, 1].
In order to protect users’ security and privacy, most SMPs have introduced pri-
vacy policies. Privacy policies are basically a set of rules to enable users to con-
trol who can access the information they disclose. These privacy policies can
be fine-grained, such that SMP users can control access to individual profile
attributes, for example address, birthdate, or cellphone number, as well as indi-
vidual pieces of user-generated content, such as posts, status updates, photos,
videos, and others. This is the case with SMPs like Google+ and Facebook.
If configured correctly, these privacy policies can enable social media users to
regulate access to their personal and sensitive information, and thus to protect
themselves against privacy violations. However, many existing studies have
shown that numerous users fail to configure their privacy policies, either be-
cause they are not aware of the existence of these policies, or because the users
find the privacy policies complex and time consuming [30, 44, 25, 47, 55].
1.2 Problem Statement
Various automated approaches have been proposed to assist users with privacy
policy configuration [25, 55, 30, 4, 56, 52]. These approaches are, however, lim-
ited to either configuring privacy policies for profile attributes, or configuring
privacy policies for user-generated content. This is problematic because both
profile attributes and user-generated content can contain sensitive information.
Therefore, protecting one without the other can still result in privacy violations.
Furthermore, most of the proposed privacy policy configuration approaches re-
quire considerable user input, which is a time-consuming process.
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The research revealed no existing solution for automating privacy policies that
caters for both profile attributes and user-generated content. Therefore, the goal
of this thesis is to propose an approach to privacy policy automation that: (1)
handles both profile attributes and user generated content; (2) requires only
minimum user input. Such an approach would provide better privacy protec-
tion than existing privacy policy automation solutions.
1.3 Proposed Solution
In order to alleviate the deficit that many social media users face with respect
to privacy policy configuration, this study proposes a privacy policy recom-
mender system. This recommender system utilises minimum input from social
media users and, in return, it provides these social media users with person-
alised suggestions about how they (i.e. users) should configure the privacy
policies of their profile attributes as well as their generated content.
The privacy policy recommender system consists of two independent compo-
nents. The first component, termed the profile attributes protector (PAP), is
responsible for suggesting suitable privacy policies for the users’ profile at-
tributes. The PAP utilises privacy policies that existing (presumably more expe-
rienced) social media users have configured for their profile attributes to sug-
gest to novice (presumably naïve) social media users as how to configure the
privacy policies for their profile attributes. The second component of the rec-
ommender, termed the user content protector (UCP), is responsible for suggest-
ing suitable privacy policies for the users’ generated content. The PAP ‘learns’
from users’ privacy policy history (i.e. the privacy policies that the particular
user has configured for his/her previously generated content), and uses this
‘knowledge’ to suggest privacy policies for the content that users might share
in the future.
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The advantage of this solution is twofold. First, both profile attributes and user-
generated content is protected, which is important in preventing privacy leaks.
Second, by providing the users with personalised privacy policy suggestions,
the issue of manual privacy policy configuration is alleviated.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, the background
work related to the area of social media and privacy policies is presented and
discussed. Chapter 3 follows this with a specification of a formal model for
describing user relationships on SMPs and the concepts that underpin privacy
policy configuration. Chapter 4 builds on the formal specifications given in
Chapter 3 to describe the theoretical framework of the privacy policy recom-
mender system. Chapter 5 presents experimental results from prototype imple-
mentation of the privacy policy recommender system. Finally, in Chapter 6 the
study is concluded with a summary of the contributions by the research and




In this chapter, the relevant background work related to the area of social me-
dia and privacy policies is presented and discussed. In addition, it presents
concepts to aid understanding of the proposed privacy policy recommender
system, presented in Chapter 4.
2.2 Social Media Platforms
The concept of social networks – “a set of people or other social entities con-
nected by a set of socially meaningful relationships” [68] – is not a recent one.
Historically, humans have been known to create intricate networks of diverse
relationships between individuals, families and tribes.
However, the advances in information and communication technology and the
emergence of the World Wide Web (www) have allowed social networks to
transcend from the physical world to the realm of online. This has given rise to
various forms of electronic social media platforms (SMPs). These SMPs can be
broadly defined as:
5
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“Any web-based (or electronic) services that allow people to: create profile that
describes them (i.e. the people); formulate and maintain a social relationships with
other people within the same service; and view and traverse the profiles and social
relationships made by others within the same service.” [13, 59, 35, 64]
The history of social media dates back to 1997 and the launch of the first ‘recog-
nisable’ SMP of SixDegrees.com. SixDegrees.com was the first website to com-
bine all the features of a SMP, such as creating profiles, articulating friendships,
and traversing friends lists [13]. Since the introduction of SixDegrees.com, the
market has been flooded with new SMPs, witnessing many short-lived success
stories (e.g. Friendster and MySpace) and many stories of failure (e.g. Orkut
and Windows Live Spaces). Most of these early SMPs did not survive due to
technical, financial or social problems.
Nonetheless, these early SMPs paved the way for the next generation of SMPs,
which have circumvented the pitfalls of the previous generation and grown
into a global phenomenon with an unmistakable social and economic impact
[35], as attested by SMPs like Facebook and Google+, which serve millions of
users globally and generate billions of dollars in revenue [35, 63, 24].
Nowadays, SMPs occupy a considerable portion of people’s online activities.
People take part in different types of SMPs ranging from general purpose SMPs
that provide their services to the greater public (e.g. Facebook and Google+), to
more exclusive SMPs that are built around a specific focus (e.g. LinkedIn, Ryze,
XING and ResearchGate).
The next section discusses the notion of privacy in general and roughly defines
privacy in the context of social media.
Chapter 2. Background 7
2.3 The Concept of Privacy
The notion of privacy has evolved over the years, from early monotonic con-
ceptualisations of privacy to recent views of privacy as a balancing act between
disclosure and concealment [38]. One such recent view is provided by Altman,
who defines privacy as “the selective control of access to the self ” [5]. Altman views
privacy as a combination of three processes: a dialectic process that involves
both disclosing and withholding information, an optimisation process that seeks
an optimum level of disclosure, and a multi-modal process that utilises different
verbal, behavioural and environmental mechanisms.
Privacy is important in human societies: it is necessary for regulating social
interactions between people and evolving individuals’ self-identity [5]. This is
why privacy as a generic process has been observed in all human societies, but
its enforcement mechanisms may differ from one society to another [5].
SMPs are human societies and are thus not an exception when it comes to the
need for privacy. In the context of SMPs, privacy can be defined as a user’s
ability to selectively control and regulate access to the information he/she per-
sonally generates, or to any information related to him/her within an SMP. This
access can be by other users within the scope of the SMP, or by some other ex-
ternal entity. Every time the control over this content is jeopardised, that user’s
privacy is violated.
In the subsequent section, the literature on privacy in social media is surveyed,
highlighting the main research focuses within the area.
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2.4 Social Media and Privacy
The emergence of SMPs and the explosion of personal information that fol-
lowed have opened a Pandora’s box of privacy and security issues, revealing a
plethora of ways in which users’ privacy and security can be jeopardised.
Consequently, a large body of research has been dedicated to addressing these
privacy and security issues. These studies can be roughly grouped into six cate-
gories, namely publishing social graph data, malicious third-party applications,
privacy attacks in SMPs, measuring privacy in SMPs, access control models for
SMPs, and privacy policies’ automation.
The following subsections briefly discuss and present examples of studies that
fall within each of the above-mentioned categories.
2.4.1 Publishing Social Graph Data
The collection of users’ profiles and the set of relationships between them in
an SMP are usually modelled as a graph, where nodes correspond to users’
profiles, and edges to a social relationship between two user’s profiles. Such a
graph is referred to as a social graph [41].
Social graph data is of interest to many third parties (i.e. external entities), since
it can be mined to reveal insightful information to businesses [31], advertisers
[22], as well as researchers. Therefore, SMP providers may wish to publish so-
cial graph data to these third parties. However, simply releasing such sensitive
data to presumably untrusted external entities jeopardises users’ security and
privacy. As a result, many researchers have investigated the issue of publishing
social graph data in a way that maintains the anonymity of the data and hence
the privacy of users.
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For instance, Campan and Truta [14] argue that the traditional way of anonymis-
ing the social graph, by simply removing identifying information, is not enough.
Campan and Truta explain that adversaries can still re-identify users and gain
access to users’ sensitive information. For example, using background knowl-
edge about the neighbourhood structure of users in the social graph or by com-
bining background knowledge about the semi-identifiable attributes (i.e. quasi-
identifiers) of users [7].
In order to resolve this issue, Campan and Truta [14] reintroduced the notion
of k-anonymity to the social media context by dividing the graph into a set
of disjoint clusters of the size of at least k, where nodes within the cluster are
generalised so that they are indistinguishable from each other. Each cluster is
then collapsed into one ‘generalised’ node. Next, a link is formed between two
clusters (i.e. generalised nodes) if they (i.e. the clusters) are not separate.
Similarly Wei and Lu [67] show that even if social graph data is anonymised
by removing identifying information and generalising node labels, adversarial
re-identification of users in the anonymised graph is still possible with some
background knowledge about the victim’s neighbourhood structure. They pro-
posed k-subgraphs as a solution that combines label anonymisation with struc-
tural anonymisation to limit the risk of privacy disclosure in social media data
publication. The k-subgraph operates in three phases: first, the social graph
is partitioned into a set of disjoint subgraphs, such that each node within the
subgraph has the same label. Second, the degrees of each node in the same
subgraph are unified. Third, disjointed subgraphs are connected if the nodes
embedded therein are connected.
On the other hand, Yuan, et al. [71] argue that anonymising the social graph
against one level of background knowledge attacks does not meet personalised
privacy requirements. In fact, it can decrease the utility of the social graph (i.e.
Chapter 2. Background 10
how much it resembles the original graph). Yuan, et al. propose a multi-level
anonymisation scheme to prevent nodes re-identification, while at the same
time maintaining the utility of the social graph.
Social graph anonymisation is an important privacy issue. However, it is only
concerned with the privacy of users when their data is being shared with third
parties. Little attention is given to the privacy of users in their daily interactions
within SMPs, which is when many of the privacy risks emerge.
2.4.2 Malicious Third Party Applications
In August 2006, Facebook released the first version of their application pro-
gramming interface (API) [24], soon followed by Google+ and others. These
APIs enable third-party developers to build applications that provide SMP users
with exciting new functionalities ranging from gaming (e.g. Farmville and
Candy Crush) to sending gifts to friends (e.g. birthday cards).
However, these applications raised several privacy issues because they have
access to users’ information and are not bound by the privacy agreements of
the SMP provider. This is a serious problem because these applications can
aggregate user data and store this data on external servers, where it can be
manipulated at the discretion of third parties.
Felt and Evans [26] studied 150 popular Facebook applications and found that
most have more access than they actually need to function. Consequently, Felt
and Evans proposed a privacy-by-proxy solution, whereby third-party applica-
tions do not directly access users’ information. Instead they interact with the
data through special markup tags.
Besmer, et al. [10] criticise the privacy-by-proxy approach, arguing that it “severely
limits the social value of many applications” [10] and, even if it did not, it
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“forces the developer to expose their business logic, usually in the form of
JavaScript, to the social network and its users” [10]. Furthermore, they argue
that current SMP architectures do not allow users to specify which information
these applications can access. Besmer, et al. suggest the alternative of adding a
new user-to-application policy, whereby users can decide which information the
application can access. This new policy, combined with the existing default ap-
plication policy, preserves users’ privacy while minimally changing the existing
architecture.
Wang, et al. [65] inspected 1,800 Facebook applications and noticed that upon
installation users cannot deny permission requests made by an application. In
addition, these permission requests do not reflect the actual scope of informa-
tion the application can access. Furthermore, they noticed that the applications
could override users’ privacy policies. In order to alleviate these issues, Wang,
et al. propose a new application authentication dialogue that enables users to
limit applications’ information access and notify users when applications’ be-
haviour might violate users’ global privacy policies.
On the other hand, Cheng, et al. [20] followed an entirely different approach by
partitioning third-party applications into external components, which are con-
trolled by the third party, and internal components, which are controlled by the
SMP. The modules running on the internal component can access users’ sensi-
tive information but cannot transmit this information outside the SMP. This not
only ensures that applications get the required access to users information, but
also that the users’ privacy remains protected.
It is worth mentioning that the release of the Facebook API v.2 addresses many
of the issues raised above. For example, users now can specify fine-grained
access permissions for each application they install in their profiles, as shown
in Figure 2.1. The new API also severely limits applications’ abilities to collect
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information about users and their friends.
(a) Application authentication dialog (b) Requested permissions by the app.
Figure 2.1: Facebook’s updates regarding applications’ access permissions
2.4.3 Privacy Attacks on Social Media Platforms
A sizeable body of knowledge is dedicated to various attacks that expose vul-
nerabilities in the standard SMPs’ privacy schemes, and pointing out solutions
to mitigating these potential risks. Such privacy attacks can be more or less cat-
egorised into three categories: graph approximation, attribute inference, and
identity clone attacks.
2.4.3.1 Graph Approximation Attacks
In graph approximation attacks, the adversary tries to reconstruct the entire so-
cial graph using locally available information for the purpose of gaining valu-
able graph statistics, such as node centrality or degree distribution, amongst
others. The work of Bonneau, et al. [12] exemplifies this category. Bonneau,
et al. reconstructed the social graph with high accuracy, using available public
listing information.
Likewise, Jin, et al. [37] developed an attack whereby an adversary uses friend
lists that are visible to him/her to compromise the friend list of a targeted victim
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user, and possibly reconstruct the entire social graph. Figure 2.2 below shows
an oversimplified version of this attack. In this scenario, Bob is the adversary
and Alice is the target. Alice has configured her privacy policies so that only
her direct friends can see her friend list. But if Bob manages to befriend Frank
and Eve, he can gain access to their friend lists, and thus infer that they both are







Visible Links Compromised Links
Figure 2.2: A simple example of a link-inference attack.
Similarly, Yap, et al. [23] show that by bribing a small set of nodes in the SMPs’
graph, attackers could compromise the friendship structure of a much larger
set of nodes, giving them a wider view of the entire graph. According to Yap,
et al. [23], such attacks can be prevented or at least severely limited by hiding
friend lists and ‘degree information’, both of which can be achieved by having
more restrictive privacy policies for friend lists.
2.4.3.2 Attribute Inference Attacks
Another category of attacks is attribute inference attacks, whereby adversaries
try to predict the value of the victim’s private (i.e. hidden) profile attributes.
Within this category, Zheleva and Getoor [72] show that hidden attributes of
private profile users can be inferred using the attributes of their friends who
have made their profile information publicly available. For example, if Bob
hid his nationality, but at the same time the majority of his friends were South
Africans, adversaries can infer that Bob is probably also a South African.
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In the same direction, Pesce, et al. [50] argue that people who are tagged in a
photo have probably shared the same place for some time, and that taking a
photograph with a person is more socially relevant than just knowing him/her.
Accordingly, Pesce, et al. have shown that attribute inference attacks can be
improved considerably by incorporating photo-tagging information.
Yang, et al. [70] follow a slightly different approach. They carried out an
attribute-based re-identification attack, whereby an attacker knows only a small
‘seed’ of the target user’s public attributes, and uses this ‘seed’ to re-identify
the target user from within a large database of users’ information, thus gaining
access to the rest of the target’s attributes. Yang, et al. defines two types of at-
tackers, namely resourceful attackers, who have the skills and resources to build
a local database of user-related information (typically by crawling SMPs and
public records), and to re-identify targets (i.e. victims) by checking their seeds
against this database. The second type of attackers are tireless attackers who
compensate for their lack of ability to build large databases of user-related in-
formation by investing more time and effort into sending the ‘seed’ information
to search engines, and then tirelessly sift through the results.
2.4.3.3 Identity Clone Attacks
Identity clone attacks are a type of attack whereby adversaries make a copy (i.e.
clone) of the victim’s profile in the SMP in order to befriend his/her friends
and gain access to their information. An example of this category is in the work
of Bilge, et al. [11], who successfully provoked an automated profile cloning
attack. First, they crawled a number of publicly available profiles and then
used data from the crawled profiles to automatically make clones. In turn, the
clones sent automatic friendship requests to victims. Furthermore, Bilge, et al.
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have shown that the original and cloned profile do not have to be on the same
SMP, and that cross-site identity cloning is possible.
Shan, et al. [54] improve upon the original identity cloning attack by adopt-
ing two novel strategies, namely snowball sampling and iteration, to increase
the request acceptance rate and create more credible clones. To solve this is-
sue, Shan, et al. proposes CloneSpotter, a server side solution that relies on IP
addresses to detect clones.
2.4.4 Measuring Privacy in Social Media Platforms
Several studies have focused on developing various measures for privacy, in-
formation leakage, and risk in SMPs, with the sole purpose of enabling SMP
users to make better-informed privacy decisions. Baker and Chen [9] argue
that measuring information leakage in SMPs is necessary, particularly due to
the scale of information being shared. Therefore, they propose PrivAware as a
solution that measures information leakage in a user’s profile, based on the pro-
file’s number of ‘inferable’ attributes. Furthermore, PrivAware suggests several
actions that users can take to mitigate leakage, such as removing risky friends.
Talukder, et al. [61] argue that even if users hide their sensitive information
it can still be inferred (i.e. leaked) using publicly available information from
the users’ friends, group membership, photo tags, etc. To solve the problem,
Talukder, et al. propose Privometer, which is an information leakage measure-
ment tool. Privometer tries to proactively infer the user’s sensitive attributes and
ranks the user’s friends according to their contribution to the sensitive informa-
tion leak. Privometer also suggests ‘self-sanitisation’ actions to the user, which
include removing those friends with the highest contribution to sensitive infor-
mation leakage.
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Liu and Terzi [43] argue that most of the research on privacy in SMPs is focused
on ‘corporate-scale’ privacy concerns and that little research is channelled to-
wards addressing privacy risks that stem from users’ information-sharing ac-
tivities in SMPs. Therefore, Liu and Terzi introduce a framework for calculating
a privacy score for SMP users. This privacy score measures the user’s privacy
risk stemming from his/her information sharing behaviour, whereby the more
sensitive the information and the more people who see that information, the
higher the privacy score. The privacy score of a user is the sum of the privacy
score of his/her profile items, and the privacy score of a profile item is a func-
tion of that item’s sensitivity and visibility.
Srivastava and Geethakumari [58] argue that there is no current measure that
enables users to evaluate their privacy situation. Therefore, Srivastava and
Geethakumari propose calculating the privacy quotient, which is a real value
that quantifies the user’s attitude towards privacy. The privacy quotient of a
user is the sum of the privacy quotients of his/her profile attributes and the
privacy quotients of a single profile attribute is a combination of the attribute’s
sensitivity, and its visibility in the SMP.
Wang, et al. [66] postulate that, without a practical way to quantify and measure
privacy, it will be difficult for users to decide how much risk they are willing to
take, or to come up with appropriate policies to protect their privacy. Therefore,
Wang, et al. propose Privacy Index (PIDX), which is a measure that quantifies
users’ privacy exposure to users based on their visible profile attributes to other
users. Where, PIDX ∈ [0, 100], such that high PIDX value indicates high privacy
exposure and low PIDX values indicate low privacy exposure.
Akcora, et al. [3] argue that there is no measure that informs users how risky it is
to form a friendship with a stranger in SMPs, even though such friendships can
have serious consequences for user privacy. Therefore, Akcora, et al. propose
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a framework for assessing the ‘riskiness’ of strangers (i.e. potential friends) to
help users in judging strangers before befriending them. In order to assess the
riskiness of a stranger, this framework considers social graph properties, profile
similarities, and the risks/benefits of befriending that stranger.
2.4.5 Access Control for Social Media Platforms
The access control model adopted by an SMP has a strong effect on users’ pri-
vacy as it dictates how they can regulate access to their information and to what
extent. Therefore, many researchers have worked on better ways to enforce ac-
cess control in SMPs.
Traditionally, most SMPs adopted an access control model that is similar to dis-
cretionary access control, whereby content owners can specify policies to regu-
late access to their content, and access rights are granted based on the existence
of a relationship between the accessor and the content owner.
Cheng, et al. [19], however, argue that this model neglects the fact that in SMPs
multiple types of relationships co-exist in the same ego-network and, by not
supporting multiple relationship types, the current model severely limits the
expressiveness of its access control policies. Consequently, Cheng, et al. [19]
propose a User-to-User Relationship-Based Access Control (UURAC) model for
SMPs. This model supports multiple types of relationships, users and resources
as targets, as well as user policies for outgoing and incoming actions utilising
regular expression notation. Furthermore, Cheng, et al. [18] refine the UU-
RAC model by adding user-to-resource and resource-to-resource relationships.
These provide even more access expressive control policies.
On the other hand, Carminati, et al. [17] contend that SMP providers are not to
be trusted with the enforcement of access control, citing several incidents where
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SMP providers violated the privacy of their own users (e.g. Facebook Beacon
application). Therefore, Carminati, et al. propose a semi-decentralised architec-
ture for SMPs, enforcing access control on the client side. This access control
model is based on trust levels, relationship types and relationship depths.
In another article, Carminati, et al. [15, 16] argue that improving the SMPs’ ac-
cess control is the first step toward addressing SMP security and privacy issues.
Carminati, et al. criticise the existing access control models for being very ba-
sic and lacking flexibility. Rather, they propose a semantic web-based access
control model that provides users with different types of policies, namely access
control polices that enable content’s owners and participants to specify who can
access this content; filtering policies that enable users to specify which type of
content should be filtered out when browsing the SMP; and admin policies that
enable the SMP’s administrator to determine things such as who can specify
access control policies and for which content.
Similar to the approach of Carminati, et al. [15, 16], Masoumzadeh and Joshi
[48] argue that SMPs contain intricate semantic relationships among users, data
objects, and between users and data objects, and that most of the proposed
access control models – including the ontology-based models – do not take
these complexities into consideration. Therefore, Masoumzadeh and Joshi pro-
pose an Ontology-Based Social Network Access Control (OSNAC) that sup-
ports high-level system-wide policies, as well as advanced user-level policies
that enable users to flexibly control their information.
Many of the access control models proposed above aim to provide more expres-
sive access control policies (i.e. privacy policies) to enable users to better con-
trol their information exposure. Through incorporating additional elements,
like trust level and relationship type, or using complex ontologies, these new
models provide flexible, expressive policies. However, as these models become
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more sophisticated, the corresponding privacy policies become more compli-
cated, adding to the existing overhead placed on end users.
2.4.6 Privacy Policies Automation
In harmony with this current research, many researchers focus on privacy poli-
cies in SMPs due in part to their importance as tools for privacy protection, but
mostly for the infamous reputation these policies have for being complex and
time consuming [30, 44, 25, 47, 55]. Subsequently, many researchers have pro-
posed some form of automation to eliminate or at least alleviate the overhead
associated with manually configuring privacy policies.
Guo and Chen [33] use item response theory (IRT) to explore the probabilis-
tic relationship between users’ privacy policies, and their level of utility and
privacy concern. Guo and Chen then recommend privacy policies that satisfy
an optimum level of utility for a given privacy concern level. Guo and Chen’s
approach seems to automate the privacy policy configuration process to a high
degree, as the only input required is the level of privacy concern. However,
privacy concern level is not measurable, and is subject to the judgement of in-
dividuals. Furthermore, their approach does not recommend privacy policies
for user-generated content.
Fang and LeFevre [25] propose a mechanism for configuring privacy policies.
The privacy policy configuration mechanism follows an active learning ap-
proach, through which the user is prompted to label a subset of his/her friends
for each profile attribute by stating whether or not the friends are allowed to
access that profile attribute or not. Next, the mechanism uses this subset of
friends to train a classifier that predicts which of the user’s remaining friends
are allowed (or not allowed) to access that particular profile attribute. While
this approach facilitates setting fine-grained privacy policies, users are required
Chapter 2. Background 20
to provide considerable input to enable the system to run efficiently. In fact, for
every profile attribute (and one can have up to 27 attributes) the user is required
to manually label a group of friends in order to train the attribute’s classifier. A
further caveat of this solution is that it does not handle privacy policies for user-
generated content, since the classifiers are trained to predict privacy policies for
profile attributes only.
Similar to the solution of Fang and LeFevre [25], Shehab, et al. [55] propose
a solution by which the user is required to label a selected subset of his/her
friends as trusted or not trusted to access a particular profile object. This subset
is then used to train a classifier that predicts which of the remaining friends
are trusted (or not trusted) to access that particular object. In contrast to Fang
and LeFevre’s [25] scheme, the Shehab, et al. scheme introduces a new concept,
merging the resulting classifier with other neighbouring users’ classifiers to en-
hance the classifier’s performance. However, the Shehab, et al. scheme also
requires substantial user input because the user has to manually label a group
of his/her friends for every profile object.
Toch, et al. [62] introduce the Collaborative Policy Analysis algorithm that anal-
yses existing privacy policies to recommend personalised default privacy poli-
cies for new users in a location-sharing SMP. Collaborative Policy Analysis works
as follows: first, it measures the similarity between every pair of existing poli-
cies by relying on the overlap in the geographical area covered by each policy,
second, it uses the K-means algorithm to divide existing policies into distinct
clusters. Lastly, it compares the new user’s information with the information of
the users in each policy cluster, and then recommends policies from the most
relevant cluster. However, calculating policies’ similarity might not always be
as convenient as it is in the case of location-sharing SMPs. Furthermore, Toch,
et al. do not provide any evaluation mechanism for the proposed solution.
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Danezis [21] proposes a solution that exploits the concept of ‘contextual in-
tegrity’. In this solution, privacy is maintained when the information is bound
within a specific context (i.e. group of users). Danezis uses social network
analysis (SNA) techniques to extract all of the possible contexts from the user’s
friendship network. Next, every piece of generated content is automatically
assigned to a possible context (or contexts). Privacy is ensured by a default
system-wide policy stating that only users in the context of an action or con-
tent are allowed to access it. This solution offers privacy with minimum input
from the user, but at the same time one of its main pillars, which is content-to-
context assignment, is still not well defined, especially regarding content types
that cannot be easily linked with a context.
Ghazinour, et al. [29, 30] introduces YourPrivacyProtector, which is a solution
that uses the K-Nearest Neighbours algorithm to find the closest three profiles
to the user (i.e. neighbours), and then uses the privacy policies of the neigh-
bouring users to suggest to the user whether or not to disclose a particular pro-
file attribute. Nonetheless, this approach provides coarse-grained privacy pol-
icy suggestions, as it only advises users to disclose or hide attributes. Further-
more, this approach cannot support privacy policies for user-generated content
because, unlike profile attributes, users might generate different types of con-
tent. For instance, Bob’s status updates are usually very different from Alice’s
status updates. Thus, it is not feasible to rely on other users’ content policies for
providing suggestions.
Alsalibi and Zakaria [4] propose a collaborative filtering privacy recommender
system. In order to recommend privacy policies to a particular target user, this
system first identifies a group of similar users (to the target), and then uses the
most frequently used privacy policies within this group to make privacy policy
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recommendations to the target user. However, this system cannot handle pri-
vacy policies for user-generated content because, like the approach of Ghazi-
nour, et al., it is not feasible to rely on other users’ content policies for providing
suggestions.
On the other hand, Jones [38] argues that current privacy mechanisms provided
by SMPs fail to capture the complexity of users’ relationships in terms of type
and strength, resulting in a huge boundary regulation problem within users’
networks and causing many users to over-share information or, in the other ex-
treme, not share any information at all. Jones claims that dividing users’ friends
into homogeneous groups that share common interest or ties helps users to
manage disclosure within their own networks. Consequently, Jones proposes
an algorithm for automatically extracting and labelling such groups, and fur-
ther studies how those groups can be automatically used to control personal
information disclosure.
Sinha, et al. [56] argue that the increasing amount of content users share in
SMPs increases the chance of users sharing content with an unintended audi-
ence. Thus, Sinha, et al. propose an automated tool to help users configure
privacy policies for the text-based content they generate. They use supervised
machine learning, particularly the MaxEnt (Maximum Entropy) classification
algorithm to predict (and then recommend) privacy policies for text-based con-
tent. However, despite being able to predict privacy policies for textual content,
this solution does not address the issue of configuring privacy policies for pro-
file attributes.
Along the same lines, Sánchez and Viejo [52] propose an automated mechanism
to inform SMP users about the privacy risks inherent to their unstructured text-
based content, in order to enable users to make more informed privacy policy
choices. The proposed mechanism adopts an information theoretic approach,
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and works by comparing the text-based content’s ‘sensitivity’ against the con-
tent owner’s privacy requirements for all types of users in the SMP. However,
this approach only warns users about potential privacy conflicts within their
generated content and does not suggest privacy policies directly to them.
The next section takes a closer look at the important topic of recommender sys-
tems, which is closely related to the privacy policy recommender system pro-
posed in this study.
2.5 Recommender Systems
Recommender Systems (RSs) or Recommendation Systems are a “class of web
applications that involve predicting user responses to options” [42]. RSs are
also defined as “software tools and techniques providing suggestions for items
to be of use to a user” [51].
Traditionally, RSs have been used in e-commerce as they enable online shop
owners to increase their sales and market more diverse products that are oth-
erwise impossible to market in traditional brick-and-mortar shops [42]. For ex-
ample, sites like Amazon attribute a large percentage of their sales to RSs. How-
ever, the uses of RSs are not limited to e-commerce only, as they are also used
in other fields, such as in recommending news articles (e.g. personalised news-
papers), travel destinations (e.g. Tripadvisor), movies (e.g. Netflix, YouTube),
and courses and books (e.g. Coursera) [51, 42].
2.5.1 The General Setup for Recommender Systems
The general setup for RSs (i.e. the environment within which RSs are formu-
lated) consists of three classes of entities, namely users who are the recipients
of recommendations; items, which are the entities being recommended to users;
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and, lastly, user-item ratings that represent the utility (i.e. value) of a specific
item to a user. Users may have a set of features that describe them (e.g. demo-
graphics), and items also can have a set of features describing them (e.g. colour







Figure 2.3: The General Setup for Recommender Systems (source: Konstan [40]).
2.5.2 How Recommender Systems Work
In general, all RSs follow three steps in order to provide recommendations for
their users, who are usually referred to as target users. The first step is collecting
some form of background data about users, items and, of course, user-item rat-
ings. This background data might vary according to the methodology used for
building the RS [51]. An example of background data – in the case of a book RS
– might be readers’ characteristics (e.g. age and gender), books’ characteristics
(e.g. title and author), in addition to the reader-book ratings.
The second step is utilising this background data to predict how target users
would rate some formerly unrated or unknown items [42]. The third and final
step is suggesting the items that receive the highest predicted ratings to target
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users. These suggestions can be presented as explicit recommendations to tar-
get users, or implicitly by, for instance, placing the suggested items strategically
on the screen so that users can spot them easily.
Almost all RSs implement the first and the third step in the same way. How-
ever, in order to implement the second step, which is predicting users’ ratings
for items, RSs follow several methodologies, for instance collaborative filtering,
content-based filtering, demographic-based filtering, and so on. These method-
ologies are briefly explained below.
2.5.2.1 Collaborative Filtering (CF)
Collaborative Filtering RSs rely on the assumption that past agreements predict
future agreements [40]. Thus, in order to predict the target user’s rating for a
specific item, CF-RSs look at how other users with similar tastes (i.e. ratings
history) have rated that item.
For instance, as shown in Figure 2.4 below, in order to predict whether Bob will
like the book The Da Vinci Code or not, the collaborative filtering RS looks at
how other readers with tastes similar to Bob’s (i.e. users who liked/disliked








Figure 2.4: How Collaborative Filtering RSs provide recommendations to users.
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2.5.2.2 Content-Based Filtering (CB)
Content-Based RSs, on the other hand, assume that similar items receive similar
ratings. So, in order to predict the active user’s rating for an item, content-based
RSs look at the items that the target user has rated previously and predict the
current item’s rating based on the similarity between it and those items.
For instance, as shown in Figure 2.5 below, if Bob previously liked The Da Vinci
Code and Angels & Demons, the content-based RS will predict that Bob might






Figure 2.5: How Content-Based RSs provide recommendations to users.
2.5.2.3 Demographic-Based (DB)
Demographic-Based RSs, on the other hand, rely on users’ demographic data
(e.g. age, gender, education, etc.) to predict users’ ratings. Demographic-based
RSs rely on the assumption that demographically similar users are more likely
to rate items similarly.
1These books: The Da Vinci Code, Angles & Demons, and The Lost Symbol are similar, they were
all written by Dan Brown, and are part of the Robert Langdon series
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For instance, as shown in Figure 2.6 below, if many demographically similar
readers to the target users have liked certain books, the demographic-based RS






Figure 2.6: How Demographic-Based RSs provide recommendations to users.
2.5.2.4 Non-Personalised (NP)
Non-personalised RSs are not customised for a specific target user, and usually
predict users’ ratings by relying on the majority vote. For example, recom-
mending the top ten best-selling books to readers [51, 36].
2.5.2.5 Hybrid Recommender Systems
As indicated by their names, hybrid recommender systems are a combination
of the previously mentioned RSs methodologies [51].
In the following section, the concept of text classification is explained, which
is a concept relevant to understanding this study’s proposed privacy policy
recommender system.
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2.6 Text Classification
Text Classification (TC) is “the activity of labelling natural language text with
thematic categories from a predefined set of categories” [53]. TC is also known
as text categorisation and topic spotting [53].
Generally speaking, in TC there is a set of documents Ω = {d1, d2, . . . , dm} (usu-
ally referred to as corpus) where each document di ∈ Ω is assigned a category
(i.e. class) from a predefined set of categories C = {c1, c2, . . . , ck}. For instance,
documents can be emails, and the categories specify whether an email is spam
or not. Or, in a different scenario, documents can be news articles, and cate-
gories can be whether an article is an economic, political, or sports article.
This text corpus is then preprocessed, such that each document di is transformed
into a set of features that describe the document. In TC, preprocessing methods
usually consist of a combination of the following steps [2, 53]:
1. Tokenisation: During this step the text corpus Ω is broken down into
small units called terms t. Terms can be individual words, as in the case
of word tokenisation, or a sequence of words, as in the case of n-gram tokeni-
sation. The set of all terms created by tokenising Ω is V = {t1, t2, . . . , t|V|},
and is commonly referred to as the vocabulary.
2. Normalisation: In this optional step, all terms are stripped of their diacrit-
ical marks (e.g. ä or â become a), lower-cased, and kept in their normal
form. This is in order to avoid treating the same word as a different word.
3. Stop Words Removal: This is an optional step, within which stop words
(like ‘a’, ‘if ’ or ‘in’) are removed from the vocabulary V. This is because
they are considered neutral and do not contribute to the classification task.
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4. Stemming: This is also an optional step, within which all words are re-
duced to their stem (i.e. basic form) by removing affixes like ‘ed’, ‘ing’,
etc.
5. Vectorisation: In this step, each text document di ∈ Ω is represented as a
|V|-dimensional vector di = 〈 fi1, fi2, . . . , fi|V| 〉. Where, each item fij can
either be a binary value representing the existence of term tj in di; or a
weighted value that represents the importance of term tj in di.
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (tf -idf ), is a widely used
method for calculating terms’ weights, and it is calculated by the follow-
ing:






Where tf(tk, di) = The number of times the term t appears in document di,
While df(tk) = The number of documents that contain term tk.
6. Dimentionality Reduction: In this step, the dimensionality of the result-
ing feature vector is reduced, by selecting an informative subset of the
terms from V instead of using all the terms in V [53].









Figure 2.7: The preprocessing phase, optional steps are in dotted boxes.
After preprocessing the initial text corpus Ω, a machine-learning classification
algorithm (e.g. Naïve Bayes, SVM, etc.), is applied to the preprocessed text
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corpus (which is denoted as Ω̂ ) to inductively build a classifier that associates
documents’ underlying characteristics to categories. This classifier is then used
to predict the categories of uncategorised documents [2], which it does by map-
ping the features of the uncategorised document to a particular category.
TC has a wide range of applications, including email and spam filtering; opin-
ion mining and sentiment analysis; document organisation; news filtering and
organisation; word sense disambiguation; and many more [53, 2].
In the next section, the concept of agent-based modelling and simulation is dis-
cussed, which is another concept relevant to understanding the proposed pri-
vacy policy recommender system.
2.7 Agent-Based Modelling and Simulation
Agent-Based Modelling and Simulation (ABMS) is a novel modelling approach
that is comprised of a set of autonomous, heterogeneous agents interacting with
each other and their surrounding environment [45]. An agent, in the context of
ABMS, loosely denotes any discrete, identifiable entity, with a set of identifiable
properties, and a set of rules governing its behaviour [45].
Different from traditional modelling and simulation approaches, ABMS follows
a bottom-up approach that enables it to simulate complex systems and phe-
nomena. In ABMS, agents usually have a set of simple rules based on which
they (i.e. agents) interact with each other and the surrounding environment.
ABMS is a powerful simulation approach for simulating systems that comprise
of many independent interacting components [46].
ABMS is widely used across many disciplines for a variety of applications, for
example social scientists use ABMS to study the dynamics and growth of so-
cial networks, economists use it to study artificial financial markets and trade
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networks, archaeologists to simulate and study the rise and decline of ancient
civilizations, and biologists use it to study animal group behaviour [45, 46].
2.8 Discussion
In order to contextualise this research, topics that are of relevance to the re-
search problem have been discussed. As SMPs are the environment within
which the research problem is situated, this chapter began with an overview
of the SMP, its origins, definitions, and the status quo. Next, since privacy and
the preservation of privacy is the end purpose of the research, a brief discus-
sion was conducted of the concept of privacy, and a rough definition of privacy
within the context of SMPs was provided. After this, the SMP privacy land-
scape was surveyed along with the research done in this broad area, identify-
ing the key research focuses, like publishing social graph data, malicious third
party applications, privacy attacks in SMPs, measuring privacy in SMPs, access
control models for SMPs and, of course, privacy policies automation, which is
the target of the research. Through discussing these research focuses, the study
highlighted the importance of privacy policies and the need for usable ways
to configure those policies. Lastly, a few concepts were discussed that are of
some relevance to understanding the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the proposed privacy
policy recommender system, such as recommender systems, text classification,
and agent-based modelling and simulation.
In the next chapter, a formal model of an SMP is devised. This will serve as a
platform for the study’s proposed privacy policy recommender system.
Chapter 3
Social Media Platform Model
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a model of a social media platform (SMP) is proposed, on the
basis of which concepts are formally defined, such as profile attributes, user-
generated content, and privacy policies. This model also serves as the platform
for a proposed privacy policy recommender system.
3.2 The SMP Model
Following the footsteps of previous research [37, 23, 14], this research models
SMPs as a simple undirected graph1 G=(V,E)1 G = (V,E), where V is the set
of users (i.e. SMP members), and E is the set of social relationships between
the users. Each node v ∈ V represents a user, and each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E
represents a social relationship between users u and v. Figure 3.1 below, shows
a simple representation of a SMP according to the above conceptualisation.
1In reality, many SMPs permit uni-directional relationships (e.g. subscribe relationships in
Facebook, and the follow relationship in Twitter). However, for the purpose of this work, only
bi-directional relationships are considered.
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Figure 3.1: A simple representation of a social media platform.
3.2.1 User Profiles
SMPs allow their users to construct and maintain profiles, which is indeed one of
the main characteristics that differentiate SMPs from other online applications.
User profiles can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. A user profile (denoted as P ) is a personal page (or space) that
serves as a digital representation of the user. A user profile consists of a fixed
set of profile attributes and a collection of user-generated contents.
Both profile attributes and user-generated content can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.2. Profile attributes (denoted as A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}) are bits of in-
formation that describe the profile owner. These profile attributes may include
demographic information, such as age or gender, as well as other information
like email and location. Profile attributes are universal, meaning that all users
have the same profile attributes, but with different values.
Definition 3.3. User-generated contents (denoted as C = {c1, c2, . . . , ct}) are, as
the name indicates, pieces of content that the user generates and shares during
his/her interaction in the SMP, such as posts, status updates, notes, photos,



















Facebook 3 3 3 3 Fine Grained
Google+ 3 3 3 3 Fine Grained
LiveJournal 3 3 3 3 Fine Grained
Twitter 3 7 7 7 Coarse Grained
LinkedIn 3 3 3 7 Fine Grained
RenRen 3 7 7 7 Coarse Grained
ResearchGate 3 7 7 7 Coarse Grained
Table 3.1: Privacy policies granularity level across different SMPs
videos, etc. User-generated contents are user-specific, meaning that each user
can have different contents in his/her profile.
3.2.2 Privacy Policies
Users’ profiles can contain information that is quite sensitive and personal, that
is why most SMPs provide users with some form of privacy policies. These pri-
vacy policies enable users to specify who can access their sensitive and personal
information, thereby specifying the boundaries within which this information
should reside.
The granularity (the level of flexibility and expressiveness) provided by these
privacy policies varies from one SMP to another. For instance, allowing users to
control access to the profile as a single unit vs. control access profile attributes
individually.
Table 3.1 above shows the granularity of the privacy policies of different SMPs.
The privacy policies provided by each of these SMPs were inspected and cat-
egorised into either fine-grained or coarse-grained, depending on whether or not
these policies enable users to control access to individual profile attributes and
individual pieces of user-generated content.
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Having fine-grained privacy policies provides users with more detailed control
over their sensitive information. Therefore, in the SMP model of this study it is
assumed that the SMP provides fine-grained privacy policies that enable users
to regulate access to every single profile attribute and piece of user-generated
content in their profiles. Privacy policies can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.4. A privacy policy is a user-defined rule in the form < item, l >,
where item can be any profile attribute aj ∈ A or any piece of content cj ∈
C, while l ⊆ V represents the audience, that is, the set of users allowed to
access the item. Usually users are provided with a finite set of audiences L =
{l1, l2, . . . , lk} to choose from. Some of these audiences are defined by the SMPs,
while users can customise others.
Let L = {me, closefriends, teammates} be the set of audiences that user u has.
An example of a privacy policy can be something like: < age, closefriends >,
which means, only users who are members of the closefriends audience are al-
lowed to access user u’s age attribute. Another example of a privacy policy
is < photo1, teammates >, which means, only users who are members of the
teammates audience are allowed to access photo1.
Privacy policies do offer SMP users a great deal of control over their personal
and sensitive information, which is the essence of privacy as described in Chap-
ter 2. However, since the SMP cannot specify ahead which privacy policies are
suitable for which user, the burden of manually configuring (i.e. fine tuning)
these privacy policies is left to the user’s discretion. This burden causes many
users to avoid using these privacy policies, and thus jeopardise their own pri-
vacy.
The next chapter discusses the theoretical framework of the privacy policy rec-





This chapter explains the technical details and theoretical framework of the pri-
vacy policy recommender system (recommender system for short) mentioned
in Chapter 1. This chapter begins with a general overview of the recommender
system and then proceeds to outline its main components and functionalities.
4.2 Recommender System Overview
In order to mitigate the difficulties that many SMP users face with privacy pol-
icy configuration, a recommender system is proposed that assists the users by
providing them with personalised privacy policy suggestions for both profile
attributes and user-generated content, while utilising minimum user input.
The recommender system has been designed as a ‘server-side’ solution, with
the understanding that the SMP provider will maintain it. The recommender
system consists of two independent components that work in parallel to protect
the users’ sensitive information. The first component, termed the Profile At-
tributes Protector (PAP), relies on the privacy policies that existing users have
specified for their profile attributes to suggest to presumably naïve target users
36
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how to configure their profile attributes’ privacy policies, thus minimising the
amount of input required from the user. Specifically, the PAP extracts these poli-
cies from the profiles of existing experienced users and then uses this data to
build several decision tree classifiers, which in turn are used to suggest suitable
privacy policies to the target users for profile attributes.
The second component is termed the User Content Protector (UCP). The UCP
learns from the target user’s privacy policy history and, on the basis of this
knowledge, suggests suitable privacy policies for the target user’s future con-
tent. The UCP relies on the targets user’s past privacy policy configurations for
generated content to train a Naïve Bayes classifier that is then used to suggest
privacy policies for the target user’s future content.
A general overview of the proposed recommender is depicted in Figure 4.1 be-
low. In the PAP the training data is extracted from the profiles of experienced
users and used to train several decision tree classifiers. The classifiers then out-
put privacy policy suggestions for the target user. The UCP works in a similar
fashion. First, the training data is extracted from the target user’s privacy pol-
icy history. This is then used to train a Naïve Bayes classifier, which outputs






































Figure 4.1: An overview of the privacy policy recommender system.
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The following subsections describe in detail how both the PAP and UCP com-
ponents, depicted in Figure 4.1 above, work to provide personalised privacy
policy suggestions for users’ profile attributes and content.
4.3 The Profile Attributes Protector (PAP)
The PAP is the recommender system’s component responsible for protecting
our target users’ profile attributes. PAP is activated immediately after a new
(presumably naïve) user registers at the SMP. PAP then suggests to the target
user how he/she should configure the privacy policies of his/her profile at-
tributes. However, in order to gain a deeper understanding of how the PAP
works, one must first understand how it suggests privacy policies for individ-
ual profile attributes, the details of which are described in the subsection below.
4.3.1 Suggesting Privacy Policies for Individual Attributes
The general setup of suggesting privacy polices for individual profile attributes
resembles traditional recommender systems described in Chapter 2. As shown
in Figure 4.2, there are three classes of entities, namely SMP users, which corre-
spond to the RS’s users; profile attributes, which correspond to items; and privacy
policies, which correspond to user-item ratings. Users are characterised by a set
of demographic traits like age, education, etc.
Guided by this general setup, and in order to suggest privacy policies for pro-
file attributes in the PAP, this study follows a demographic-based approach to rec-
ommender systems, where the motivating assumption is that demographically
similar people have similar privacy policies for their profile attributes. The
advantage of choosing a demographic-based approach over other approaches









Figure 4.2: General setup for suggesting privacy policies for profile attributes.
(e.g. collaborative filtering), is that demographic-based approaches do not re-
quire any prior input from the target user, as they rely only on the target user’s
demographical information, which is already available on the target users’ pro-
file.
The process by which the PAP suggests privacy policies for an individual pro-
file attribute say ai ∈ A, consists of the following three phases.
4.3.1.1 Phase I: Data Collection
The first phase is the data-collection phase. In this phase, training data is col-
lected from the profiles of existing experienced users. Since the recommender
is designed to be a server-side solution, it is expected to have direct access to
users’ profile data. Therefore, from each existing user’s profile, demographic
information is extracted, as well as the privacy policy that the user (i.e. pro-
file owner) has set for the ai attribute. This collected information is stored in a
datasetD, in which every record is of the form ( ~F , lj ), where ~F = 〈 f1, f2, . . . , fm 〉
is the user’s demographic information, representing the features, and lj is at-
tribute ai’s privacy policy, and it represents the class label.
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4.3.1.2 Phase II: Classifier Training
The second phase is the classifier-training phase. In this phase, a machine learn-
ing classifier is trained (i.e. built) to predict the privacy policies that the target
users set for the ai attribute. For this task a decision tree learning algorithm
is selected because decision tree learning algorithms are capable of handling
classification of categorical, noisy, and incomplete data [49], which are the char-
acteristics of the training data D.
In order to train this classifier, a decision tree algorithm is applied to the dataset
D, which carries out the task as follows. First, the algorithm looks at the train-
ing dataset D and finds the feature f∗ that tells us the most about users’ choice
of privacy policies for the ai attribute. It does this using a statistical measure
called information gain (gain for short), which is given by equation (4.1) below.
Gain(D, f∗) = H(D)−H(D|f∗)
where H(x) is the entropy of X
and is given by H(x) = −p(x) log(p(x))
(4.1)
The algorithm then uses the feature with the highest gain (i.e. f∗) to create the
root node. Next, the training dataset D is partitioned into several partitions,
such that each partition contains records that have the same value for f∗. Next,
for each partition p, the algorithm looks for the feature f∗p that has the highest
gain within p and uses it (i.e. f∗p) to create a child node. The partition p itself is
then re-partitioned and the process is repeated, until every partition has almost
the same privacy policy, or the algorithm runs out of training records.
The final classifier is represented as a decision tree, wherein each tree node
represents a test for a specific feature fi ∈ ~F (i.e. demographical trait), and each
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edge branching from the node corresponds to one of possible values of fi. The
leaf nodes correspond to class labels (i.e. privacy policies).
Figure 4.3 is an example of such a tree. This decision tree predicts the privacy
policies of the ai attribute, by testing the target user’s features at the root node,
and moving down the tree to a child node that corresponds to the value of the
tested feature. The target user’s features are then retested at the child node
and moved down the tree progressively. The process is repeated until a leaf is
reached. The privacy policy associated with this leaf is the predicted privacy
policy for the ai attribute.
  :Agef 1














Figure 4.3: An example of a decision tree.
4.3.1.3 Phase III: Privacy Policy Suggestion
The third and final phase is the suggestion phase. This phase is triggered by
the arrival of a target user. When a target user registers on the SMP, the fea-
tures ~Ftarget = 〈 f1, f2, . . . , fm 〉 (i.e. demographical information) are extracted
form his/her newly created profile. Next, the target user’s features ~Ftarget =
〈 f1, f2, . . . , fm 〉 are passed to the decision tree classifier, which in turn predicts
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a privacy policy for the ai attribute. This privacy policy is then simply sug-
gested to the target user. In Figure 4.4 below, the process of suggesting privacy
















Figure 4.4: Suggesting privacy policies for individual profile attributes.
4.3.2 Suggesting Privacy Policies For All Attributes
So far, a description has been given of how privacy policies are suggested for
one profile attribute. In order to suggest privacy policies for all the attributes in
the target user’s profile, the previously described process is repeated for each
one of the profile attributes.
Specifically, as shown in Figure Figure 4.5, demographic information and pri-
vacy policies are extracted from the profiles of existing users. This data is then
used to build a series of training datasets {D1, D2, . . . , D|A|}, one for each profile
attribute ai ∈ A. Afterwards, the decision tree learning algorithm is applied to
these training datasets, to train a series of classifiers CL = {cl1, cl2, . . . , cl|A|}.
This is such that each classifier cli ∈ CL predicts the privacy policies that the
target users will set for an attribute ai ∈ A, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |A|}. Finally, each
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time a target user registers at the SMP, his/her demographics are passed to ev-
ery classifier cli ∈ CL, to predict the privacy policies of every attribute in the
target user’s profile. These predicted policies are then suggested to the target
user.
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The following section describes in detail how the second component of the rec-
ommender system (i.e. UCP) works.
4.4 The User Content Protector (UCP)
The UCP is the component responsible for protecting our target users’ content.
As mentioned earlier, UCP is activated after the target user joins the SMP, where
it ‘learns’ from the privacy policies that the target user has specified for some of
his/her previous content, and uses this knowledge to suggest privacy policies
for the target user’s future content.
The general setup for suggesting privacy policies for user-generated content
(which is depicted in Figure 4.6 below), consists of three main classes of enti-
ties, namely SMPs users, which represent the RS’s users; user-generated content,
which represent items; and the privacy policies that the target user specifies for
his/her content, and which represent user-item ratings. Each piece of user-









Figure 4.6: General setup for suggesting privacy policies for user-generated.
Guided by this general setup, the UCP follows a content-based approach to rec-
ommender systems, where the motivating assumption is that similar pieces
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of user-generated content have similar privacy policies. A content-based ap-
proach was selected for UCP because usually each user generates different
content to others. Therefore, its not feasible to suggest privacy policies for
content generated by one user; based on the privacy policies that other users
have specified for their content, like in the case of collaborative filtering, and
demographic-based approach recommender systems.
The process by which the UCP suggests privacy policies for content generated
by a particular target user, say ut ∈ V , consists of the following four phases.
4.4.1.1 Phase I: Data Collection
The first phase is the data-collection phase. In this phase the privacy policy
history of the target user’s content is collected. More specifically, this is all
content generated by the target user, in addition to the privacy policy associated
with that content. This collected data is stored in a dataset Ω, in which every
record is in the form (ci, lj), where ci is a piece of content generated by the target
user ut, and lj is the privacy policy that ut has specified for ci.
4.4.1.2 Phase II: Preprocessing of The Data
The second phase is the preprocessing phase. In this phase every piece of con-
tent ci ∈ Ω, is transformed to a vector of features that characterise ci, thereby
transforming the row dataset Ω into a dataset of labelled feature vectors Ω̂, in
which every record is in the form ( ~ci , lj), where, ~ci = 〈 fi1, fi2, . . . , fim 〉 is ci’s
feature vector. The preprocessing phase can be implemented for all types of
user-generated content; however, the features might differ from one content
type to another. For instance, in text-based content like status updates, fea-
tures might be words; while in visual content like photos, features may include
metadata, tagged persons, whether the photo contains faces, and so on.
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4.4.1.3 Phase III: Classifier Training
The third phase is the classifier-training phase. In this phase the classifiers that
predict privacy policies for the target user’s future content are trained. This
is such that one classifier is trained for each type of user-generated content.
Unlike the PAP profile attribute classifiers, these content classifiers are unique
to the target user whose privacy history they (i.e. the classifiers) were trained
with.
For constructing these classifiers, the Naïve Bayes classification algorithm is
used, which is a member of a well-known family of classification algorithms
that are based on Bayes theorem (given in equation (4.2)).
P (B|A) = P (A|B)P (B)
P (A)
(4.2)
The Naïve Bayes was chosen over the decision trees algorithm because it is
more suitable for the task, as it is quicker to train and test, which is impor-
tant for predicting privacy policies for user-generated content, where the time
between creating and sharing a content is very short.
In order to build the classifier, the Naïve Bayes algorithm is applied to the pre-
processed dataset Ω̂. Naïve Bayes follows a probabilistic model whereby, in
order to predict the privacy policy for a piece of user-generated content ci,
Naïve Bayes selects the privacy policy l∗ ∈ L that maximises the probability
P (lj|f1, f2, . . . , fm) ∀lj ∈ L, which is the probability that the privacy policy lj
will be observed given that the features {f1, f2, . . . , fm} that characterise content
ci are observed. This privacy policy (i.e. l∗) is determined as follows.
First, according to Bayes theorem (given by equation (4.2) above), the prob-
ability that the privacy policy lj will be observed given that ci’s features (i.e.
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{f1, f2, . . . , fm}) are observed, is calculated as follows.
P (lj|f1, f2, . . . , fm) =
P (f1, f2, . . . , fm|lj)P (lj)
P (f1, f2, . . . , fm)
(4.3)
Now, by assuming that the ci’s features are conditionally independent1, equa-
tion (4.3) above can be rewritten as:





P (f1, f2, . . . , fm)
(4.4)
By definition, l∗ is the privacy policy that maximises the probability P (lj|f1, f2, . . . , fm),
which, according equation (4.4) above, is the privacy policy that maximises the
following term.






P (f1, f2, . . . , fm)
]
(4.5)
Since P (f1, f2, . . . , fm) is constant for all lj ∈ L, then









Where the probability P (lj) and each of the conditional probabilities P (fi|lj) are
estimated from the preprocessed dataset Ω̂.
4.4.1.4 Phase IV: Privacy Policy Suggestion
The fourth and final phase is the suggestion phase. This phase is triggered
when the target user ut generates any new piece of content cnew. This content
(i.e. cnew) is first preprocessed to transform it into a vector of features. This fea-
ture vector is then passed to ut’s classifier, which in turn predicts cnew’s privacy
policy. Following this, the predicted policy is simply suggested to ut. Figure 4.7
1This assumption is referred to as the naïve assumption, hence the name naïve bayes. It is
called naïve assumption because it rarely holds in real life.
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Figure 4.7: The process of suggesting privacy policies for user-generated content.
4.5 Privacy Analysis
Privacy policies enable users to protect their privacy by allowing users to spec-
ify the boundaries within which their sensitive information resides. However,
since these boundaries might differ from one user to another, SMP providers
tend to provide open (i.e. very permissive) default privacy policies, thus leav-
ing the task of configuring (i.e. fine tuning) these policies to its users. As a
consequence, by default new SMP users have no, or at best very little, privacy,
unless they configure their privacy policies to suit their privacy needs.
However, for ‘privacy-aware’ users who invest the time and effort to configure
their privacy policies, it is assumed that their policies are correct, and more
privacy preserving of the SMP’s default policies.
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Therefore, by relying on the privacy policies of the existing SMP users, the sug-
gested recommender system ensures that targets users’ profile attribute privacy
policies are as privacy-preserving as the policies of existing ‘privacy-aware’
users, which is better than the SMP’s default and, by relying on the target user’s
privacy history, the recommender system ensures that target user’s content’s
privacy policies are as privacy-preserving as the user’s own privacy history,
which is also better than the SMP’s default.
The next chapter discusses an experiment carried out by the study for imple-
menting a basic prototype of the privacy policy recommender system, as well




Building upon the privacy policy recommender system framework theorised in
Chapter 4, this chapter walks through the design choices and the experiments
conducted to implement a basic prototype of the proposed privacy policy rec-
ommender system. In addition to the results obtained from these experiments.
This chapter begins by describing the experimental platforms used for imple-
mentation..
5.2 The Experimental Platforms
In order to implement the privacy policy recommender system prototype, sev-
eral software tools and packages were used, including the following:
1. Facebook Graph API1: This is an application programming interface de-
veloped by Facebook. This Graph API enables third-party (i.e. external)
developers to connect to Facebook’s social graph and gain ‘regulated’ ac-
cess to users’ information. Facebook Graph API was used to collect some
1Documentation: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api
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of the SMP data required for experiments, as described later in this chap-
ter.
2. NetLogo2: A widely used agent-based modelling and simulation (ABMS)
environment, developed at Northwestern University [69]. NetLogo is
used to synthetically generate the SMP data required for experiments, as
described later in this chapter. Figure 5.1 below shows a snapshot of the
NetLogo’s interface.
Figure 5.1: A snapshot of NetLogo, featuring our SMP simulation model.
3. Weka3: A popular machine learning/data mining package developed at
the University of Waikato. Weka provides a variety of algorithms for
data preprocessing, classification, clustering, association, and visualisa-
tion [34]. Weka’s algorithm implementations were used to train and vali-
date the recommender system’s classifiers, as described later in this chap-
ter. Figure 5.2 shows a snapshot of Weka’s interface.
2Website: https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/
3Website: http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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Figure 5.2: Weka machine learning platform.
4. Experimental Workstation: All of the experiments were conducted on a
workstation, with an Intel core i7-4790 3.60 GHz processor, and 8GB of
RAM.
Having described the experimental platforms, the following sections provide
the details of implementing the recommender system’s prototype and the ob-
tained results.
5.3 Implementing The Recommender System
In order to implement the proposed privacy policy recommender system, sev-
eral experiments were carried out that were primarily focused on building the
classifiers that predict privacy policies for target users. These experiments in-
clude both the profile attributes protector (PAP), as well as the user content
protector (UCP).
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5.3.1 Implementing The Profile Attributes Protector (PAP)
In order to implement the profile attributes protector (PAP), focus was placed
on building the most important elements of this component, which are the clas-
sifiers that predict the privacy policies of the target users’ profile attributes. To
start, the necessary training data for building these classifiers was collected.
5.3.1.1 Data Collection
In order to train (i.e. build) the PAP profile attributes classifiers, it is essential
to obtain rich datasets of users’ demographic information and privacy policies.
However, acquiring such rich datasets is difficult due to the sensitive nature
of SMPs’ data, and the numerous privacy and ethical issues associated with it
[73]. As an alternative, the researchers opted to synthetically generate training
datasets through simulating an SMP.
At later stages of the work, a real dataset was obtained (henceforth, referred to
as the CFPRS dataset) that was used in a similar study by Alsalibi and Zakaria
[4]. Even though the CFPRS dataset is structurally different to the simulated
datasets, it can provide a valuable insight as to how the recommender will be-
have with real data. Therefore, it was decided to use both the simulated and
the CFPRS datasets during experiments.
The following sub-sections describe how synthetic datasets were generated through
simulation, and also briefly describe the CFPRS dataset.
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5.3.1.1.1 The SMP Simulation Model
In order to generate relatively realistic data to train the PAP classifiers, the re-
searchers opted to simulate an SMP. In order to simulate the SMP, the Agent-
Based Modelling and Simulation approach (ABMS) was followed, as described
in Chapter 2. An ABMS approach was selected because SMPs are complex sys-
tems formed by many users interacting with each other and, according to Macal
[46], ABMS is suitable for simulating such complex systems. The SMP simula-
tion was implemented using the NetLogo ABMS environment.
The main building blocks of the SMP simulation are agents, which represent the
SMP’s users. For simplicity, each agent is assigned only eight profile attributes:
A = {age, gender, university, country, city, interests, language, relationship status}.
In addition to profile attributes, each agent is characterised by three internal
properties that govern its behaviour, namely a friendship threshold λ ∈ [0, 1],
which indicates how friendly an agent is; a maximum nodal degree δ, which
represents the maximum number of friendships an agent can maintain [6]; and
lastly, a privacy concern θ ∈ [0, 1], which quantifies the agent’s level of privacy
concern [33].
The values of the agents’ categorical attributes are given values that are selected
uniformly from a predefined value-set. It is assumed that the numerical age at-
tribute is normally distributed. As for the internal properties, it is assumed that
the values of the friendship threshold, the maximum nodal degree, and the privacy
concern are also drown from a normal distribution.
In order to simulate how a user’s friendship graph is formed, two concepts are
relied on, namely homophily and triadic closures. Homophily is the love of the
same [8], while triadic closures describe the tendency to make friendships with
friends of friends [39]. The idea of using these concepts is to ensure that the
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SMP follows the same pattern of friendship formation as is the case in typical
real-life SMPs. The friendship graph is formed as follows: each agent u checks
whether its current number of friends has reached its internal maximum nodal
degree δu. If this is not the case, then u selects another random agent v, and
calculates the percentage of their identical profile attributes S(u,v) ∈ [0, 1] (given
by equation (5.1) below), and percentage of their mutual friends mf(u,v) ∈ [0, 1]









Where, u , v are agents and auj, avj are their corresponding profile attributes.
While 1{condition} is an indicator function that returns 1 when condition is







Where, mutual(u, v) is the number of common friends between agents u & v,
and friends(x) is the number of friends agent x has.
Next, if the friendship score given by a linear combination of S(u,v) and mf(u,v),
is greater than u’s internal friendship threshold λu, then a friendship is formed
between u and v. This ‘socialisation’ process is repeated until all agents reach
their maximum nodal degrees (i.e. no. friendships).
The privacy policy configuration process is inspired by the work of Guo and
Chen [33], in which profile attributes are classified by sensitivity (that is pri-
vacy weights), and the privacy policies that are assigned for an attribute are
influenced by the user’s level of privacy concern and the attribute’s privacy
weight. Following this heuristic, each profile attribute aj ∈ A was assigned,
an arbitrary privacy weight waj ∈ [0, 1] that indicates aj’s sensitivity. Next, in
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order to set a privacy policy for an attribute, say ai, each agent u was mod-
elled to first calculate ai’s privacy score (scoreai), which is a linear combination
of u’s privacy concern θu, and ai’s privacy weight wai . The numerical privacy
score is then mapped to one of four possible audiences: L = {only me, friends,
friends of friends, public}. Such that the lower the privacy score, the wider the
audience is (e.g. scoreai = 0 =⇒ l = public ).
The SMP simulation model was designed to be flexible, where the number of
agents, and the weights of profile attributes are parameters that can be modified
at every simulation. This simulation model also facilitates exporting the data
generated by each simulation in several standard formats like arff and csv. The
full implementation details of the simulation can be found in Appendix A.
5.3.1.1.2 Generating Synthetic Training Datasets
The above SMP simulation model was used to generate synthetic training datasets.
Specifically, the model was used to run several simulations of SMPs of differ-
ent sizes. Then, by the end of each of these simulations, every agent’s demo-
graphic data and profile attributes’ privacy policies were collected and stored in
a dataset. Several control datasets are also generated, where the privacy poli-
cies are assigned randomly to the agent’s demographics. The reason behind
this is to make sure that whatever patterns observed in the simulated datasets
(if any) are not products of mere randomness.
5.3.1.1.3 The CFPRS Dataset
The CFPRS dataset was used in a similar study by Alsalibi and Zakaria [4]. Al-
salibi and Zakaria collected the data via an online survey, where they prompted
the 477 respondents for the values of eleven profile attributes, namely user
name, date of birth, location, gender, relationship status, education, religion,
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email, cellphone, languages and profile picture. Alsalibi and Zakaria then asked
the respondents to specify suitable privacy policies for these profile attributes
by choosing from four possible audiences, namely Public, Friends, Friends of
Friends, and Only Me. However, for this study the researchers were granted ac-
cess to only a subset of the original dataset. The final dataset contains the actual
values of three attributes only, namely gender, location, and religion attributes,
in addition to the privacy policies of all eleven attributes.
Now that both of the training datasets have been described, the next sub-section
discusses how the PAP’s classifiers are built and validated.
5.3.1.2 Classifiers Training And Evaluation
In order to train (i.e. build) the PAP profile attributes’ classifiers, the J48 al-
gorithm was used, which is Weka’s implementation of the C4.5 decision tree
learning algorithm. Specifically, the J48 algorithm was applied to the synthetic
datasets (both simulated and random) of the research in order to train eight
classifiers, one for every profile attribute in the SMP simulation model. Each of
these classifiers was trained several times, using datasets of different sizes each
time.
Next, in order to measure how well these classifiers can actually predict the
privacy policies of the target users’ profile attributes, an evaluation method
was used called n-fold cross-validation. In the n-fold cross-validation method, the
training dataset is divided into n equal parts, such that n − 1 parts are used
to build a classifier. This classifier is then used to predict the privacy policies
for the remaining part. The privacy policies predicted by this classifier are then
compared against the already known privacy policies for that part. This process
is repeated n times, and the best performing classifier is reported.
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In this case, a 10-fold cross validation test (Weka’s default) was performed on
the classifiers, recording the accuracy of each classifier, that is the percentage
of the records that the classifier was able to predict the privacy policies for
correctly. The cross-validation results showed a significant difference between
simulated and random datasets. The classifiers trained on simulated datasets
achieved an accuracy ranging from 60% to 80%, while the classifiers trained on
random datasets achieved an accuracy ranging from 20% to 30%. This is evi-
dent in Figure 5.3 below, which shows the accuracy of each profile attribute’s
classifier, plotted against the size and the type of its training dataset.
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Figure 5.3: (figure continued in the next page.)
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Figure 5.3: The performance of the classifier of every profile attribute, when trained on both
random and simulated datasets. Such that, the accuracy of each classifier is plotted against the
size of the dataset used for training it.
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In order to further enhance the accuracy of the classifiers, the structure of the
training datasets was changed. Specifically, the features used in training the
classifiers were extended by incorporating the privacy policies of other profile
attributes into the feature vector. For example, to train the classifier of the age
attribute, features were used that are a combination of users’ demographic in-
formation and the privacy policies they set for other profile attributes. That is,
the privacy policies of other profile attributes in {A− {age}}.
Classifiers were then retrained on the new datasets, and the accuracy of each
classifier was measured using the aforementioned methodologies. The results
showed a noticeable 15% to 25% improvement in the accuracy of the classifiers
trained on simulated datasets. On the other hand, no significant improvement
was noted on the accuracy of classifiers trained on random datasets. This is
evident in Figure 5.4 below, which shows the accuracy of each profile attributes
classifier, plotted against the size and the type of the dataset used for training
that particular classifier.
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Figure 5.4: (figure continued in the next page.)
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Figure 5.4: The performance of the classifier of every profile attribute, when trained on simu-
lated vs. random datasets, while using extended vs. only demographic features. Such that, the
accuracy of each classifier is plotted against the size of the dataset used for training it.
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In addition to synthetic datasets, experiments were also conducted training the
PAP classifiers on a real dataset. The J48 algorithm was applied to the CFPRS
dataset to train eleven classifiers, one for each profile attribute in the CFPRS
dataset. Each of these classifiers is trained several times, such that each time an
increasing percentage of records were used from the CFPRS dataset.
Next, in order to evaluate the performance of these classifiers, a 10-fold cross
validation test carried out, and the accuracy of each classifier was recorded as
it was being trained using different percentage of records.
The cross validation results showed that the accuracy of the classifiers ranged
on average from 60% to 70%, which is a bit lower than the classifiers trained
on the simulated datasets. However, similar to the simulated datasets, a notice-
able average of 17% improvement was observed in the classifiers’ performance
when demographics and privacy policies were used as features. This is de-
picted in Figure 5.6 below, which shows the accuracy of the classifiers trained
on the CFPRS dataset, where the accuracy of each classifier is plotted against
the percentage of CFPRS records used to train it.
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Figure 5.5: (figure continued in the next page.)
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Figure 5.6: (figure continued in the next page.)
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Figure 5.6: The performance of the PAP profile attributes classifiers as they trained on the CF-
PRS dataset, while using extended vs. only demographic features. The classifiers were trained
multiple times on different percentage of record from the CFPRS dataset, where, the accuracy of
each classifier is plotted against the percentage of the dataset records used for training it.
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In the following section the experiments carried out for implementing the user
content protector (UCP) component are reviewed.
5.3.2 Implementing The User Content Protector (UCP)
In order to implement the user content protector (UCP) component, the re-
search focused on building the classifiers that predict the privacy policies for
targeted user’s content because they are the most critical element of the UCP.
However, despite the fact that target users can generate/share different types
of content, for the purpose of these experiments, only text-based content was
worked with because of its availability. As a consequence, the study focuses on
building one classifier, for one type of user-generated content (i.e. text-based
content). Nonetheless, it is still possible to do so with other content types, like
photos for instance [57]. Next, the necessary data is collected for building (i.e.
training) the classifier.
5.3.2.1 Data Collection
In order to collect training data Ω, the researchers used Facebook’s graph ap-
plication programming interface (API) to download textual posts from the au-
thor’s Facebook account, which will serve as text-based user-generated content.
Particularly, from each post three fields are recorded: message which holds the
actual content of the post, description which contains descriptions of hyperlinks
within the post (if any), and finally, name which contains the name of the page
or the person the post is being shared from.
Next, since all of the downloaded posts were shared under the default pri-
vacy policy, their privacy policies were manually configured. Each post was
assigned a privacy policy by selecting from one of three audiences, namely
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L = {allfriends, closefriends, liberals}. The general guideline followed in labelling
posts is: if the post is personal it should be visible to closefriends, if controversial
it should be visible to liberals, otherwise it should be visible to all friends.
In total, 596 posts were downloaded, 293 of them were written in English, and
290 were written in Arabic, while 13 posts were written in both. In the next step
the training data Ω is preprocessed, so that it could be used by text classification
algorithms to train the PAP content classifier.
5.3.2.2 Preprocessing The Data
Since the study is limited to text-based content, the text classification preprocess-
ing methods that described in Chapter 2 were used. Specifically, in order to
preprocess the corpus of textual posts Ω, Weka’s StringToWordVector filter was
used. The StringToWordVector filter provides many options for preprocessing
steps like tokenisation, stemming, normalisation, etc.
The preprocessing phase begins by normalising each content (i.e. post) ci ∈ Ω
by lower-casing letters and removing diacritical marks4. Then, the data was
stemmed using the lovins stemmer provided by the StringToWordVector filter5.
Next, to create the term vocabulary V, word tokenisation was used, whereby
every content ci ∈ Ω is broken down into words (i.e. blocks of consecutive
characters). However, only a maximum of 100 words were kept (Weka’s de-
fault) from each class in the vocabulary to reduce the dimensionality of the
resulting feature vectors. Lastly, for vectorisation the study followed a binary
approach, where only the terms existence in content was registered, with no
regard for its frequency.
4For normalising Arabic content, the Ar-PHP package https://github.com/
tawfekov/ar-php was used
5Since the lovins stemmer only works on English content, Arabic content was left un-
stemmed.
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After the above preprocessing steps, the raw textual dataset Ω is transformed
into a dataset of labelled feature vectors Ω̂, ready to be used to build the con-
tent’s classifier, as discussed in the following section.
5.3.2.3 The Classifier Training and Validation
Before the UCP content classifier is trained, the preprocessed dataset Ω̂ is first
divided into a training & validation dataset TV , which contains 70% of the records
in the preprocessed dataset; and a test test dataset Te that contains the remain-
ing 30%. This is as usually advised in text classification tasks [53].
Next, for building the UCP content classifier, the researchers experimented with
three variations of the Naïve Bayes algorithm, namely Naïve Bayes, multinomial
Naïve Bayes, and complement Naïve Bayes, in addition to Weka’s Sequential Mini-
mal Optimization (SMO) algorithm. Each of these algorithms was applied on the
training & validation dataset TV , which resulted in the construction of several
classifiers.
However, since only one classifier is needed to predict the privacy policies of
the target user’s content, a way was required to select one of these classifiers
to be the main PAP content classifier. Therefore, a 10-fold cross-validation test
was performed with the intention of selecting the best performing classifier.
The cross-validation results show that the classifiers’ accuracy ranged between
45%-50%, and the best performing classifier was the one trained using comple-
ment Naïve Bayes, which achieved 50.11% accuracy. Figure 5.7 below shows the
accuracy of the classifiers resulting from applying the above classification algo-
rithms to the TV dataset.
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Figure 5.7: The accuracy of the content classifiers, when trained on a normalized, stemmed,
word-tokenized & binary-vectorized dataset, using different algorithms.
In an effort to enhance the classifiers’ accuracy, the researchers returned to the
preprocessing phase. This time, in the tokenisation step, the number of words
to be kept from each class was increased to 2000. A stop-words removal step
was also added. For vectorisation, the tf -idf weighting scheme was used in-
stead of the previous binary scheme. Furthermore, since the resulting vocabu-
lary is large (863 terms), another training set was created using the same afore-
mentioned preprocessing steps but with an additional dimensionality reduc-
tion step in which all terms with information gain less than zero was removed.
After re-training the classifiers on the new datasets, and measuring their ac-
curacy, an average of 11.5% performance improvement was noted, where the
accuracy increased to 52%-64%, and the highest classifier is still the one trained
using complement Naïve Bayes, this time achieving accuracy slightly over 64%.
However, there was no tangible improvement in the performance when using
dimensionality reduction. This is shown in Figure 5.8 below, which reflects the
content classifiers’ accuracy after changing the preprocessing phase.
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Figure 5.8: The accuracy of the content classifiers, after increasing the vocabulary size,removing
stop words, and using tf -idf weighting scheme, with/without dimensionality reduction.
In order to further enhance the classifiers accuracy, the preprocessing phase
was returned to. This time, the same preprocessing steps that were used pre-
viously were used again, except for tokenisation, where 3-gram tokenisation
was used instead of word tokenisation. The cross-validation results showed
a small accuracy improvement; while highest accuracy is still achieved by the
classifier trained using complement Naïve Bayes, which was around 65.2%. Fig-
ure 5.9 below shows the content classifiers’ accuracy after the final changes to
the preprocessing phase.
Dimensionality Reduction No Dimensionality Reduction
Classifier Performance − NGram Tokenization
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Figure 5.9: The accuracy of the content classifiers, after increasing the vocabulary size,removing
stop words, using tf -idf weighting scheme, and 3-gram tokenization, with/without dimension-
ality reduction.
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The experimental results showed that the highest accuracy was achieved by the
classifier trained using complement Naïve Bayes; on a dataset preprocessed using
a combination of normalisation, stemming, 3-gram tokenisation, stop-words
removal, and tf -idf weighting. Therefore, this classifier was selected to be the
UCP’s main content classifier.
Next, in order to further evaluate the performance of the selected classifier, the
chosen classifier (i.e. the complement Naïve Bayes) was validated on the ‘un-
touched’ testing data set Te. The results showed that the classifier’s perfor-
mance was relatively stable, achieving an accuracy of around 64.2%. This can
be viewed in Figure 5.10 below, which shows the accuracy of the selected UCP
content classifier as tested on the test dataset Te.
Dimensionality Reduction No Dimensionality Reduction
Complement Naïve Bayes 
Classifier's Performance















Figure 5.10: Accuracy of selected UCP content classifier when evaluated on Te.
In the next chapter, the work is concluded with a discussion of the experimental




The goal of this research was to help SMPs users (especially inexperienced ones)
configure the privacy policies of their profile attributes, as well as their gener-
ated content, while requiring minimum input from the users.
In order to meet these goals, a framework was proposed for a privacy policy
recommender system that assists SMPs’ users by providing them with person-
alised suggestions as to how they should configure the privacy policies of both
of their profile attributes and contents. The recommender system was designed
to be deployed on, and maintained by, the SMP provider and it consists of two
independent components that work in parallel to protect users’ privacy.
The first component is the profile attributes protector (PAP), which is respon-
sible for suggesting suitable privacy policies for target users’ profile attributes.
The PAP follows a demographic-based approach to recommender systems, whereby
it relies on the privacy policies that existing (presumably more experienced)
users have specified for their profile attributes to suggest to new (presumably
naïve) target users how to configure their profile attribute privacy policies.
Specifically, the PAP uses the existing SMP’s users’ demographic information
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and privacy policies to train a series of decision tree classifiers, then the PAP
uses these decision tree classifiers to suggest suitable privacy policies for our
target users’ profile attributes.
The second component is the user content protector (UCP), which is responsi-
ble for suggesting suitable privacy policies for content generated by our target
users. The PAP follows a content-based approach to recommender systems,
whereby it ‘learns’ from the privacy policies that the target user has specified
for content he/she shared in the past (i.e. privacy policy history), and then uses
this acquired ‘knowledge’ to suggest suitable privacy policies for content that
this particular target user might share in the future. Specifically, the UCP uses
the target user’s privacy policy history to train a Naïve Bayes classifier, and
then uses this classifier to suggest suitable privacy policies for other content the
target user might share in the future.
For the purpose of assessing the feasibility of the proposed privacy policy rec-
ommender system framework, the researchers experimented with implement-
ing a basic prototype of the privacy policy recommender system, focusing pri-
marily on the classifiers that predict users’ privacy policies.
In order to implement the PAP component of the recommender system’s pro-
totype, the researchers used both simulated and real datasets for the task of
training the PAP profile attribute classifiers. The results showed that when sim-
ulated datasets are used, the PAP classifiers are able to suggest privacy policies
for profile attributes with a high accuracy, ranging between 60-80%. Further-
more, this accuracy can be improved by up to 25% if a combination of demo-
graphics and privacy policies are used as features. When the real dataset was
used, however, the accuracy was slightly lower; ranging between 60-70%, but
this is expected given the structural differences between the simulated and the
real dataset. Interestingly, however, there was an average of 17% improvement
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in the accuracy when a combination of demographics and privacy policies were
used as features. This is indicative of the fact that the classifiers’ accuracy (and
thus the PAP’s accuracy) rate can be significantly increased by requiring the
user to provide some privacy policies for a few attributes.
In order to implement the UCP component of the recommender system’s pro-
totype; the researchers collected a dataset of posts (i.e. user-generated content)
from the author’s Facebook account. They then experimented with applying
different combinations of preprocessing steps (e.g. word vs. n-gram tokenisa-
tion, binary vs. tf -idf weighting, with/without dimensionality reduction) on
recently harvested data, to transform it from a corpus of text, to a dataset of la-
belled feature vectors. Next, several classification algorithms were experimen-
tally applied to the preprocessed datasets in order to train the user-generated
content classifier. The results showed that the best performing UCP content
classifier was able to predict suitable privacy policies for user-generated con-
tent with an accuracy reaching about 63%.
In general, the experimental results of the privacy policy recommender sys-
tem’s prototype implementation were promising, as they showed that such a
recommender is indeed feasible and that it (i.e. the recommender) was able to
predict (and hence suggest) suitable privacy policies for both profile attributes
and user-generated content with high accuracy, while requiring only minimum
input from the SMP’s users.
6.2 Future Work
Experimental results for implementing the recommender system’s prototype
were promising. However, the fact that (synthetic and incomplete) data was
used for implementing the PAP, in addition to data from only one user (i.e. the
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author) for implementing the UCP, might not truly reflect the reality. Therefore,
a further investigation of how the recommender system will perform on differ-
ent datasets is needed. For instance, implementing the PAP component using
complete and real SMPs datasets, and implementing the UCP component using
different datasets from different users.
Furthermore, since in this work the scope of the recommender system (the UCP
component in particular) was limited to suggesting privacy policies for text-
based user-generated content only; future work should involve investigating
how the current approach would generalise to other types of user-generated
content, like photos and videos.
Additionally, in order to train (i.e. build) the UCP content classifier, a ‘batch
learning’ approach to machine learning was followed, where a complete train-
ing dataset existed prior to building the classifier. However, in reality target
users generate content sequentially, which means there will be a period of ‘idle-
ness’ where the recommender waits for the target user to generate enough train-
ing data in order for it (i.e. the recommender) to build that target user’s content
classifier. Therefore, an ‘online learning’ approach is suggested for future work
when building the UCP content classifier, whereby the classifier is incremen-
tally updated with the arrival of new training data. This way there will be no
period of ‘idleness’. Furthermore, if there is a clear feedback loop, the target
user could be more involved in training his/her content classifier.
In general, the recommender system’s classifiers managed to predict privacy
policies with high accuracy. However, the performance of some classifiers still
needs improvement. Therefore, future work should also involve working on
improving the accuracy of the recommender system’s classifiers.
Lastly, in order to evaluate the performance of the recommender system’s pro-
totype, the researchers relied on methods like cross validation to measure how
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well the recommender system’s classifiers can predict users’ privacy policies.
However, since the proposed recommender system is expected to be used by
real users, future work should involve extending the evaluation mechanism by
getting real users to evaluate the recommender system, instead of solely relying
on methods like cross validation.
Appendix A




;#### A SIMULATIION MODEL FOR AN ####




;;;;; CREATING THE USERS BREED ;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
breed[users user]
;;;;; DEFINING USERS’ (I.E. AGENTS’) CHARACTERISTICS ;;;;;
users-own[









;;;;; USERS’ INTERNAL PROPERTIES ;;;;;
privacy-concern ;; indicating the users level of privacy concern.
my-friendship-threshold ;; indicating how "friendly" the user is.
my-maximum-degree ;; the maximum no. friends the user is able to maintain.
policies-configured?










;;;;; CREATING GLOBAL VARIABLES ;;;;;
globals [genders universities countries cities interests languages
relationship-status privacy-policies attributes-weights is-random-data ]
i
;;;;; INITIALIZING GLOBAL VARIABLES (FUNCTION) ;;;;;
to intitialize-globals
set genders ["male" "female"]
set universities ["UCT" "UP" "UWC" "Wits" "Rhodes"]
set countries ["south-africa" "sudan" "nigeria" "france" "canada"
"Swaziland" "kenya" "cuba" "ghana"]
set cities ["khartoum" "cape-town" "Johannesburg" "Durban"
"Pretoria" "Mhluzi" "Port-Elizabeth"]
set interests ["music" "sports" "reading" "dance" "programming"
"traveling" "theater" "cinema"]
set languages ["arabic" "english" "french"
"xhosa" "zulu" "afrikaans"]
set relationship-status ["single" "in-a-relationship" "married" "engaged"]
set privacy-policies ["public" "friends-of-friends" "friends" "only-me"]
end
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;;;; PREPARING THE SIMULATION ;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
to setup
ca ;; clearing all variables
reset-ticks
intitialize-globals ;; initializing global variables
set is-random-data false
;;;;; NOW WE ACTUALLY CREATE THE USERS (I.E. AGENTS) ;;;;;




;;;;; ASSIGNING VALUES TO PROFILE ATTRIBUTES ;;;;;
set age ceiling abs random-normal 30 5 ;;the age attribute is...
;;... distributed gaussian with mean 30 and variance 5.
set gender item (random 2) genders ;; the attribute gender ...
;;...is selected at random (i.e. uniformly distributed).
set university item (random 5) universities ;; the attribute university...
;;...is selected at random (i.e. uniformly distributed).
set country item (random 9) countries ;; the attributes country ...
;;...is selected at random (i.e. uniformly distributed).
set current-city item (random 7) cities ;; the attribute city ...
;;...is selected at random (i.e. uniformly distributed).
set my-interest item (random 8) interests ;; the attribute interests...
;;...is selected at random (i.e. uniformly distributed).
set my-language item (random 6) languages ;; random language
set my-relationship-status item (random 4) relationship-status ;;attribute...
ii
;;... relationship-status is selected at random (i.e. uniformly distributed).
;;;;; ASSIGNING VALUES TO USERS’ INTERNAL PROPERTIES ;;;;;
set privacy-concern abs random-normal .5 .15 ;; the privacy-concern livel...
;; is distributed gaussian with mean .5 and variance ,15.
set my-friendship-threshold abs random-normal .5 .15 ;; the friendship...
;; threshold is distributed gaussian with mean .5 and variance ,15.
set my-maximum-degree ceiling abs random-normal 0 10 ;; the maximum degree...
;; is distributed gaussian with mean 0 and variance 15.
set policies-configured? false












;;;;; COUNTING FRIEND-IN-COMMON (FUNCTION) ;;;;;
to-report friend-in-common [source dest]
;; initially no friends in common
let result 0
let flag false
;; count the friends in common
ask [link-neighbors] of source
[
set flag true
if (member? dest link-neighbors) [set result result + 1]
]
;; return the percentage of the friend in common.
ifelse flag [report result / count [link-neighbors] of source][report 0]
end
;;;;; SOCIALIZE: FORMING THE FRIENDSHIP-GRAPH (FUNCTION) ;;;;;
to socialize
tick
set-current-plot "No. Users who Configured Their Settings"
clear-plot
iii
layout-spring users links .5 10 5 ;; making the layout of the graph.
ask users [
;; check if this user have reached his internal maximum no. friends.
if( (count link-neighbors) <= my-maximum-degree)[
let me self
;; the set of all possible friends.
let possible-friends other turtles with [not member? self
[link-neighbors] of me]
;; pick one possible friend at random.
let new-friend one-of possible-friends
;; calculate the mutual friend percentage.
let mutual-friends-percentage friend-in-common me new-friend
;; calculate the similarity percentage.
let attribute-similarity similarity me new-friend
;; calculate the friendship score.
let frienship-score ( (.7 * attribute-similarity)
+ (.3 * mutual-friends-percentage) )
;; finally decide whether to form a friendship or not.





;; if all users have made enough friendships, stop socializing.
if(not any? users with [ (count link-neighbors) <= my-maximum-degree])
[stop]
end
;;;;; SIMILARITY BETWEEN USERS (FUNCTION) ;;;;;
to-report similarity [me otheruser]
;; initializing the similarity result
let sim-result 0
if ([age] of me = [age] of otheruser )
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
if ([gender] of me = [gender] of otheruser )
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
if ([university] of me = [university] of otheruser )
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
if ([country] of me = [country] of otheruser )
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
if ([current-city] of me = [current-city] of otheruser )
iv
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
if ([my-interest] of me = [my-interest] of otheruser )
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
if ([my-language] of me = [my-language] of otheruser )
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
if ([my-relationship-status] of me = [my-relationship-status] of
otheruser )
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
if ( ([privacy-concern] of me - [privacy-concern] of otheruser) < .05 )
[set sim-result sim-result + 1]
;; calculate the similarity percentage
set sim-result sim-result / 9
report sim-result
end
;;;;; SIMULATE PRIVACY POLICIES (FUNCTION) ;;;;;
to simulate-privacy-policies
ifelse (count users with [ not policies-configured? ] >= 10) [
tick
;; ask ten random user to concider configure their privacy policies.
ask n-of (random 10) users with [ not policies-configured? ] [
set color yellow
;; calculating user’s motivation to configure his/her privacy policies.
let friends-who-configuered-policies 0
if any? link-neighbors [ set friends-who-configuered-policies (count
link-neighbors with [policies-configured?] / count link-neighbors ) ]
let motivation ( alpha * privacy-concern + beta *
friends-who-configuered-policies )
;;if the user is motivated enough, configure the privacy policies.




;;;;; CONFIGURING PRIVACY POLICIES (FUNCTION) ;;;;;
to configure-privacy-policies [ selected-users ]
ask selected-users [ ;; alpha, beta, and the weights are simulation parameters.
;; configuring the privacy settins for individual profile attributes.
set age-PrivacyPolicy get-privacy-policy (
v
(alpha * privacy-concern) + (beta * age-weight) )
set gender-PrivacyPolicy get-privacy-policy (
(alpha * privacy-concern) + (beta * gender-weight) )
set university-PrivacyPolicy get-privacy-policy (
(alpha * privacy-concern) + (beta * university-weight) )
set country-PrivacyPolicy get-privacy-policy (
(alpha * privacy-concern) + (beta * country-weight) )
set current-city-PrivacyPolicy get-privacy-policy (
(alpha * privacy-concern) + (beta * current-city-weight) )
set interests-PrivacyPolicy get-privacy-policy (
(alpha * privacy-concern) + (beta * interest-weight) )
set language-PrivacyPolicy get-privacy-policy (
(alpha * privacy-concern) + (beta * language-weight) )
set relationship-status-PrivacyPolicy get-privacy-policy (
(alpha * privacy-concern) + (beta * relationship-weight) )





;;;;; GET POLICIES VALUE (FUNCTION) ;;;;;
to-report get-privacy-policy [ input ]
if ( input >= 0.00 and input <= 0.25) [report item 0 privacy-policies]
if ( input > 0.25 and input <= 0.5 ) [report item 1 privacy-policies]
if ( input > 0.50 and input <= 0.75) [report item 2 privacy-policies]
if ( input > 0.75 ) [report item 3 privacy-policies]
end























set age-PrivacyPolicy item (random 4) privacy-policies
set gender-PrivacyPolicy item (random 4) privacy-policies
set university-PrivacyPolicy item (random 4) privacy-policies
set country-PrivacyPolicy item (random 4) privacy-policies
set current-city-PrivacyPolicy item (random 4) privacy-policies
set interests-PrivacyPolicy item (random 4) privacy-policies
set language-PrivacyPolicy item (random 4) privacy-policies









report round ( mean [(count link-neighbors)] of users )
end
to-report max-degree
report max [(count link-neighbors)] of users
end
to-report min-degree
report min [(count link-neighbors)] of users
end
to-report no-of-friendships








set time (word substring date-and-time 0 8 "@" substring
date-and-time 16 27)
set time replace-item 2 time "-"
set time replace-item 5 time "-"
let extention ""
let rand ""
let graph-file-name (word "Exported Files\\graph-[" num-users "]-"
time ".gexf")
if (output-file-type = "weka-arff") [
set extention ".arff"
]
if (output-file-type = "csv" ) [
set extention ".csv"
]
if (output-file-type = "general") [
set extention ".txt"
]
if(is-random-data) [set rand "random-"]
let dataset-file-name (word "Exported Files\\" rand "dataset-["
num-users "]-" time)
;;;;; GEXF FILE ;;;;;
file-open ( graph-file-name )
file-print (word "<?xml version=" "’1.0’" "encoding=’UTF-8’" "?>")
file-print (word "<gexf" " xmlns=’https://people.cs.uct.ac.za/~aabuelgasim’"
"version=’1.2’" " >")
file-print (word "<meta lastmodifieddate=" "’timer’" " >" )
file-print (word "<creator>Ammar M. Abuelgasim</creator>")
file-print (word "<description> Simulated Social "
"Network Dataset </description>")
file-print (word "</meta>")
file-print (word "<graph mode=" "’static’" "defaultedgetype=’undirected’" ">")
file-print "<nodes>"
ask users [







file-print (word "<edge id=’" end1 link-counter "’ source=’"
[who] of end1 "’ target=’" [who] of end2 "’/>")






;;;;; GEXF FILE END ;;;;;
;;;;; ARFF FILE ;;;;;
if (output-file-type = "weka-arff" or output-file-type = "all") [
file-open( (word dataset-file-name ".arff" ))
file-print (word "@relation " "Simulated-"
(substring dataset-file-name 15 49) " \r\n" )
file-print " \r\n"
;;feature attributes
file-print (word "@attribute age real \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute gender {male, female} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute university {UCT, UP, UWC, Wits, Rhodes} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute country {south-africa, sudan, "
"nigeria, france, canada, Swaziland, kenya, cuba, ghana} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute current-city {khartoum, cape-town, "
"Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria, Mhluzi, Port-Elizabeth} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute my-interest {music, sports, reading, "
"dance, programming, traveling, theater, cinema} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute my-language {arabic, english, "
"french, xhosa, zulu, afrikaans} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute my-relationship-status {single, "
"in-a-relationship, married, engaged} \r\n")
;;class attributes
file-print (word "@attribute age-PrivacyPolicy {public, "
"friends-of-friends, friends, only-me} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute gender-PrivacyPolicy {public, "
"friends-of-friends, friends, only-me} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute university-PrivacyPolicy {public, "
"friends-of-friends, friends, only-me} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute country-PrivacyPolicy {public, "
ix
"friends-of-friends, friends, only-me} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute current-city-PrivacyPolicy {public, "
"friends-of-friends, friends, only-me} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute interests-PrivacyPolicy {public, "
"friends-of-friends, friends, only-me} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute language-PrivacyPolicy {public, "
"friends-of-friends, friends, only-me} \r\n")
file-print (word "@attribute relationship-status-PrivacyPolicy "
"{public, friends-of-friends, friends, only-me} \r\n")
file-print " \r\n"
file-print "@data \r\n"
ask users with [policies-configured?] [
file-print (word age "," gender "," university "," country "," current-city
"," my-interest "," my-language "," my-relationship-status ","
age-PrivacyPolicy "," gender-PrivacyPolicy "," university-PrivacyPolicy




;;;;; ARFF FILE’s END ;;;;;
;;;;; CSV FILE ;;;;;
if(output-file-type = "csv" or output-file-type = "all") [






ask users with [policies-configured?] [
file-print (word age "," gender "," university "," country "," current-city ","
my-interest "," my-language "," my-relationship-status "," age-PrivacyPolicy ","
gender-PrivacyPolicy "," university-PrivacyPolicy "," country-PrivacyPolicy ","
current-city-PrivacyPolicy "," interests-PrivacyPolicy "," language-PrivacyPolicy




;;;;; CSV FILE END ;;;;;
;;;;; TAKING A SCREENSHOT ;;;;;
Export-Interface (word dataset-file-name ".png" )
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